Вооружённые силы ДР Конго
|Место действия: = |Оружие: = Walther PP, ТТ, MAT-49, Uzi, MAS-36, АК-47, АКМ, Тип 56, FN FAL, FN FNC, M16A1, IMI Galil, РПД, РПК, FN MAG, ДШК, ДП-27, РПГ-7 |Боевая техника: = Т-55, Т-72, Тип 59, Тип 62, ПТ-76, AML-60, AML-90, БМП-1, Panhard M3, TH 390 Fahd, 122 mm howitzer 2A18, Тип 81 |Доспехи: = |Враги: = Катангская армия, Армия Южного Касаи, Симба, Альянс демократических сил за освобождение Конго, Вооружённые силы Уганды, Вооружённые силы Руанды, Вооружённые силы Анголы, Вооружённые силы Бурунди, МПЛА, СВАПО, Национальный конгресс народной обороны, Фронт националистов и интеграционистов, Конголезское объединение за демократию, УНИТА |Символ: = }} Вооружённые силы Демократической Республики Конго или FARDC (сокр. от Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) — совокупность сухопутных войск, военно-морских сил и военно-воздушных сил, предназначенная для защиты населения, государственного строя и территориальной целостности Демократической Республики Конго. С 27 октября 1971 по 17 май 1997 года — Вооружённые силы Заира. История Until 1977 Zaire saw itself as a country with especial qualifications for leadership in Africa: as the Congo, it was neither French nor British, but Belgian. Zaire further claimed links with west Africa, through its small but important access to the sea at the mouth of the Congo (Zaire) River, and also links with east Africa as Swahili is a lingua franca in much of eastern Zaire, and SwahiH is an east-coast language. Zaire's attainment of independence in 1960, at the end of an era of colonial rule distinguished by heavy paternalism and lack of any real preparation for nationhood, was followed by a period of the utmost confusion, violence and strife necessitating the mounting of a large United Nations Expeditionary Force. Stability was really only achieved in Zaire with the return to power, in 1965, of General Mobutu, the Army Commander in a second coup. Since then Zaire's pohtical and military prestige has increased, though its economy poses severe and worsening problems. The Zaire army has its origins in the Force Publique created in 1888 in the sinister period of King Leopold ll's personal rule. For the most of the colonial period the Force Publique was both defence force (with pacification commitments) and gendarmerie. One of its distinctive features was a deUberate Belgian pohcy of ethnic mixing and integration: this had certain advantages but also could lead to zmoral deracine behaviour as in 1960. In World War I units of the Force served in the Cameroun and German East Africa campaigns, but it was Httle used in World War II. In 1959 the Force was divided into regular military units and gendarmerie, and at independence became the Congo National Army (ANC). These have now become the FAZ {Forces Armies Za'iroises). At independence the Force had no Congolese officers; more important still the charisma of the authority to which it owed its creation and loyalty had gone, and the ANC's suh-elite status appeared insecure. Mutinies and collapse of discipline resulted, with the consequent United Nations intervention. The ANC disintegrated into conflicting groups of almost mindless gunmen, some linked to political factions and supported and armed by revolutionary regimes elsewhere, others solely concerned with plunder. As firstly Chief of Staff and later Army Commander, Mobutu tried initially to create a smaU nucleus of disciplined soldiers around him and then recreate efficient units — he willingly accepted help both from member units of the United Nations Force, and also a small cadre of Belgian regulars. Finally he reabsorbed the breakaway units who had been following the various Lumumba and Tshombe pohtical factions. He continued to be assisted by the Belgians, and then from 1962 onwards, also by the USA on an increasingly large scale. But the ANC was not strong enough to suppress the Simba rising, for which European mercenaries had to be imported. It was against these mercenaries and after his second coup, that Mobutu's reformed ANC won its first real successes. The mercenaries, who alleged that they had not been paid and refused to depart, had allied themselves with mutinous soldiers from the Shaba (Katanga) area, but the ANC, stiffened by United States money and logistic support, forced them to withdraw via Rwanda. By the end of the 1960s the ANC had in some measure returned to discipline and training. Young officers trained abroad in Belgium, Britain or France had returned to units, Kitona Base was beginning to appear a credible military training centre and other service schools had opened. But cases of indiscipline by soldiers — sale of weapons, robbery with violence, and extortion, were still frequent and occur occasionally to the present time. Despite his mihtary road to power, Mobutu's regime is not essentially a military one: the President rarely appears in uniform, and the style of the one-party regime, its quest for 'authenticity' , and revolutionary songs and slogans, all indicate a search for a mass popular appeal; the President sees the army as a people's revolutionary army — a crucible of revolutionary mihtancy and commitment. His regime remains, however, very authoritarian, the President's office being the centre of an exceedingly intricate pattern of relationships which serve to keep the President informed on all events in major State institutions. In 1974 rural development and political education were laid down by the President as two major mihtary training priorities. In 1975 there was some evidence of discontent among some senior army officers at both the overall pohcy of the regime and the tasks it devolved on to the army. Three former generals, a colonel and a major were arrested, convicted and sentenced to death for conspiracy to overthrow the government in August— September, 1975. Further upheavals took place in 1977 and early 1978. As a result of the army's feeble performance in the March, 1977 Shaba crisis (see below), Mobutu dismissed the Chief of Staff and some 35 senior officers of general and colonel rank; some of these appear to have, out of resentment, been involved in a conspiracy in February, 1978. This plot was discovered and further arrests of officers followed. Reports of a rising in January , 1978 in the Kwilu area — an area which has in the past produced opponents of President Mobutu — are also circulating. These reports vary; most note the commitment of FAZ units in suppressing the unrest. Zaire's army has two roles: defence against foreign aggression and internal security. Even prior to the dramatic events of March, 1977 the army had been committed to internal security work, chiefly in the north-eastern area of the country and in the Lake Tanganyika area. Small units of the Zaire army were deployed in Angola in support of Holden Roberto's FN LA in 1975 — 6; their performance appears to have been poor. Relations with Congo— Brazzaville were also strained in this period (despite some rhetoric of reconcihation), and occasional border shootings occurred. With the victory of the MPLA Zaire found herself with a serious mihtary problem; her ambitions in the Cabinda area and her support for the FNLA made her the prime target for the victorious MPLA /Cuban forces, Zaire's geographical configuration — long frontiers together with limited access to the sea rendering her particularly vulnerable. In March, 1977 with the clear connivance of the Angolan MPLA government a force of some 2000 (not the 5000 alleged by Zaire) crossed the border into Zaire's Shaba province, taking the town of Mutshatsha and advancing on the important town of Kolwezi. These insurgents were claimed to be Shaba inhabitants, seeking a liberation firstly of their province and secondly of Zaire as a whole. The claim is doubtful. Cuban detachments were reported. The FAZ, however, withdrew precipitously, seeming to have no desire to stand and fight. The President appealed for help, and a Moroccan force arrived in French aircraft, with some French logistic support. As in Benin, the Moroccans had their own reason, the Polisario, for opposing any Marxist advance. This force of 1500 excellent soldiers quickly disposed of the insurgents. Zaire rhetoric subsequently made great claims for the Zaire units which had been raUied — these included a unit of pygmies equipped with bows and arrows — but the triumph was a Moroccan one. It is far from clear whether the worthless performance of the forces of Mobutu's regime have harmed him in the manner that might be expected. Indeed March, 1977 may possibly have afforded him a renewed lease of life. His OAvn personal pohtical skill in snatching victory from disaster seems to have revived his flagging prestige among the populace as a whole, although the humihation undoubtably bit into many in senior government echelons. This bitterness was one of the causes of the February, 1978 events. But March, 1977 led to a resumption of United States, French and Belgian financial assistance, reinforced by a contribution from Saudi Arabia. IntemaUy some long-overdue political and military reforms have been initiated. Although Mobutu's previous grand designs for power and African hegemony may have been tarnished to the outside observer, his own domestic position may now be more secure. Certainly, powerful interests both at home and abroad are Ukely to want to see his continuance in power, a final reason being that no successor seems remotely probable. The FAZ will, however, need a prolonged period of reorganisation, re-equipment and improved training before it can be rated as an effective field force. Организация Zaire's army consists of 14infantry battahons, plus a further seven described as 'guards' and a further seven described as 'parachute' or 'commando'. The training for these latter is far from complete. In addition there is one armoured car regiment, one mechanised infantry battaUon and there are also small artillery and other support and logistic units. One tank battalion has recently been formed and another is to be raised. The command organisation is one of seven (regional) brigade groups and one 'parachute' division. Some of the gendarmerie battahons come under army command. RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND RESERVES Mihtary service is voluntary, and no particular ethnic group now appears to be favoured or disadvantaged, though until 1970 the western half of the territory provided most of the recruits. There is no shortage of volunteers. Kitona Camp remains Zaire's largest training centre, providing most of the army's basic training, together with training for speciahst transport, signals and engineer units, and NCO and officer courses. Parachute training takes place at Ndjili and infantry training at Kotakoli. Foreign training is used extensively and has been drawn from a number of sources. Some specialist personnel and cadets are trained in France, others in Britain. A small British team trained army engineers at Likasi. Belgium trains a number of mihtary personnel of different ranks and arms. The USA does the same, and also maintains a military training mission. ItaUan personnel assist with air force training. Several Belgian instructors remain at work in the Zaire army, but their status — whether they are loan personnel or are recruited on contract — is not known. Israeli instructors established the Ndjili parachute training facihties, but these all returned home in the 1960s. The proposed arrival of a North Korean training team was also reported in 1976; but this now seems unlikely. Moroccan training staff, in small numbers, arrived after the events of 1977, and French assistance has also been reported. Some friction exists between older officers, promoted colonial NCOs and younger men trained in foreign academies. Вооружение Zaire had no arms industry. Zaire's equipment, like its training assistance, is drawn from many- sources. Over lOOPanhard AML H-60 and H-90 armoured cars have been purchased from France; there are in addition some American M3 and British Ferret vehicles. One report notes the arrival of two battaUon's worth of Chinese Type-62 tanks, and Soviet-designed (though not necessarily Soviet-made) anti-tank missiles. Some artillery weapons have been reported but their calibre and source is also unclear. West Germany has provided some army transport and engineering equipment. The air force includes: some 20Aermacchi MB 326 Hght jet aircraft designed as trainers but useful for air-to-ground strike duties; three C130 Hercules transports (with three more on order); SOhelicopters (20 Alouettes and 30 Pumas); and other light transport and training aircraft. A squadron of Mirage V strike aircraft is being delivered from France; some 15 aircraft in all are expected. Униформа These generally follow the Belgian pattern, except that a square or kerchief is worn around the neck in place of a collar and tie. В июне 2010 г. были введены новые знаки различия. Галерея Файл:Post-291-1349454170.jpg|Лейтенант танковых войск Заира. Черная пилотка и черные погоны с желтыми кантами обозначают принадлежность к танковым частям, золотистая пальмовая ветвь на погоне — звание лейтенанта. Кроме цветового обозначения, танкистам Заира полагалась эмблема в виде буйвола, стоящего на девизной ленте с надписью "TROUPES BLINDEES" (фр. Танковые войска). Файл:Post-291-1349454711.jpg|Эмблема танковой школы Заира (отличается от общепринятой только надписью на девизной ленте). Файл:Post-291-1349454884.jpg|Вышитая эмблема танковых войск. Файл:Post-291-1349454980.jpg|Погон капитана армии Заира. Файл:Post-291-1346437818.jpg|Два полковника ВВС ДРК в новой униформе с новыми знаками различия, введенными в июне 2010 г. Желтые погоны и петлицы в данном случае обозначают не вид ВС или род войск (службу), а служат для отличия штаб-офицеров. Офицер слева — военный врач, о чем свидетельствует эмблема на петлице, справа — пилот. Файл:Post-291-1346438294.jpg|Полковник ВС ДРК в полевой форме. Желтые погоны служат для обозначения принадлежности к штаб-офицерам, три головы леопарда на красной подкладке обозначают звание полковника, скрещенные черные копья — декоративный элемент, обозначающий принадлежность к сухопутным войскам, красная и голубая полоски обозначают принадлежность к национальным ВС. Полковник является военным капелланом (протестантом), о чем свидетельствует мальтийский крест на лацканах воротника. Файл:Post-291-1346438990.jpg|Погон лейтенанта сухопутных войск ДРК. Голубые погоны установлены для младших офицеров, звание лейтенанта обозначено двумя копьями, два скрещенных бивня — декоративный элемент, обозначающий принадлежность в сухопутным войскам и младшему офицерскому составу, красная и желтая полоски обозначают принадлежность к национальным ВС. Файл:Congolese_soldier.jpg| Файл:IMG_3284.jpg|Женское формирование. Файл:Sipa_ap21503289_000003-592x296-1498124108.jpg| Файл:Конго.jpg| Файл:Post-392-1280698771.jpg|Значок парашютистов ДР Конго. Источники *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo *http://www.sammler.ru/index.php?showtopic=101828&page=11 *John Keegan. World Armies. — P.822-824. Категория:Воины Категория:Воины эпохи Холодной Войны Категория:Воины Современности Категория:Воины XX века Категория:Воины XXI века Категория:Воины Африки Категория:Воины ДР Конго Категория:Вооружённые силы